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Abstract 
A set of studies tested whether people can use awareness of ignorance to provide 
enhanced test consistency over time if they are allowed to place uncertain items into a 
“don’t know” category. For factual knowledge this did occur, but for a range of other 
forms of knowledge relating to conceptual knowledge and personal identity, no such 
effect was seen. Known unknowns would appear to be largely restricted to factual kinds 
of knowledge. 
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Many statements in natural language may be termed vague. A vague statement is 
one that is neither clearly true nor clearly false. Philosophical treatments of vagueness 
(Keefe & Smith, 1997; Williamson, 1994) have largely focused on the logical problems 
surrounding the Sorites Paradox. Named for the Greek word for “heap” the paradox 
concerns whether removing just one grain of sand from a heap could ever make the 
difference to the truth of the statement “this is a heap”. Of course, if the answer is no, 
then the heap can be reduced one grain at a time until all the sand has gone, while in the 
style of the smile on the face of Carroll’s Cheshire Cat the heap remains. But the answer 
yes just seems counter-intuitive, especially considering that the grain size can be 
reduced at will making each step infinitesimally small. Vagueness more broadly has 
also been demonstrated in other domains, such as geographical location (Fisher et al. 
2004). 
Our interest in vagueness in the present paper first arose in the context of 
categorization. In a seminal paper by McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978), they provided 
evidence that people’s understanding of most of our common semantic categories, such 
as Sports, Fruit or Vehicles is vague. McCloskey and Glucksberg gave participants lists 
of possible category members (e.g. for fruit it could include apple, pineapple, coconut, 
olive, pumpkin), and asked them to say Yes or No as to whether they were members of 
the category. The participants returned some weeks later and repeated the task. 
Vagueness in categorization was seen in two ways. First there were in each list 
borderline items for which there was poor consensus. In fact the likelihood of people 
saying Yes was smoothly distributed across the scale from zero to one (see Hampton, 
1998). Second, where people disagreed about categorization they were also more likely 
to be inconsistent in their responses across the two occasions. In other words, items such 
as olive as a fruit were not at the borderline just because of different beliefs across 
individuals, but they were also borderline because many individuals did not hold a 
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consistent belief of their own about the categorization. 
The principal question that is posed here concerns whether people are reliably 
aware of this uncertainty and potential inconsistency in their judgments of the truth of 
statements. The experiments to be reported examined a number of different knowledge 
domains, but we illustrate the issue first in respect of categorization.  
A strong case can be made that there are certain statements which everyone would 
agree are true or false, while there are other statements that everyone would 
acknowledge are borderline or difficult to agree on. The latter we might term the 
“known unknown” to use a phrase made familiar by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of 
Defence of the USA from 2001 to 2006, under President George W. Bush (Seely, 2003). 
For example everyone would agree that apples, oranges and bananas are fruit, and that 
potatoes and cabbages are clearly not. Then again, perhaps everyone would agree that it 
is difficult to classify tomatoes, olives, avocados and pumpkins as fruit. If this triage is 
possible, then it should be the case that allowing people three response options in a 
categorization task (Clearly True, Unclear, and Clearly False) should improve the 
consistency of the responses at retest. A person who knows that the truth of a statement 
is unclear can simply use the middle response on each occasion. On the other hand if 
they are forced to choose between True and False, as in the traditional categorization 
task, they will have to make a decision as best they can, and may therefore have a higher 
likelihood of giving an inconsistent response at retest. 
The comparison of consistency in responding between a 3-response (Clearly True, 
Unclear, and Clearly False) and a 2-response (True, False) group thus provides a novel 
test of metacognitive awareness of the vagueness or uncertainty in a decision. Before 
briefly describing other work on similar problems of metacognition, let us consider an 
alternative hypothesis about how people may respond when given 3 rather than 2 
responses to use. According to the threshold model of categorization (Hampton, 2007; 
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Verheyen, Hampton & Storms, 2010), people decide whether an item is in a category by 
comparing it with a prototype representation of the category concept. Integrating across 
different dimensions whose relevance and weight is determined by the concept and by 
the context, an overall similarity is calculated and compared to a threshold criterion. If 
the similarity surpasses the criterion a True response is triggered, and if not, a False is 
given. Random variation in the process of computing similarities and variation in the 
placement of the criterion naturally lead to the kind of probabilistic responding and 
inconsistency seen in the McCloskey and Glucksberg data. They also explain the slower 
decision times seen near to the category borderline (Hampton, 1979, 1995; McCloskey 
& Glucksberg, 1979). To adapt the model to the 3-response version of the task, one can 
simply propose that the participant adopts two threshold criteria, one higher threshold to 
separate a Clearly True from an Unclear, and a second lower threshold to differentiate 
an Unclear from a Clearly False. The Unclear response will therefore be most likely to 
be given to items with intermediate levels of similarity to the category, falling between 
the two threshold points. Note however that the variability in the computation of 
similarity and the placement of criteria is not affected by this adaptation. So whatever 
sources of variance led to probabilistic responses and inconsistency in the 2-response 
case will still be present with equal force in the 3-response case. So the threshold model 
predicts that providing 3 responses will have no effect on the level of inconsistency 
observed in categorization. It will be just as hard to remain consistent when deciding 
what is clearly a fruit as it is when deciding what is a fruit simpliciter.  
Metacognitive awareness. The question of how aware people are of their degree 
of knowledge has attracted a large amount of research in the field of metacognition. It is 
known for example, that people are generally overconfident in estimating the number of 
answers that they get correct on a quiz (Fischoff et al. 1977). In fact when they state 
they are 100% certain of the answer, on average they may be wrong around 10% of the 
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time. A large literature on calibration of judgments exists which relates people’s 
subjective estimates of the probability of being correct to their actual accuracy 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982, Koehler et al., 2002). Another literature has grown up around 
the concept of Feeling of Knowing (Klin, Guzman & Levine, 1997; Koriat, 1993). It has 
been demonstrated that when recall of an item fails in a cued recall task, people can 
reliably predict which targets they would be able to recognize in a subsequent 
recognition test. This research has been extended to negative feelings of knowing—
knowing that you will not be able to remember something—in work by Liu, Su, Xu & 
Chan (2007).  
The possibility of awareness of ignorance (known unknowns) was demonstrated 
in an early study by Glucksberg and McCloskey (1981). They showed that providing 
people with relevant but uninformative facts slowed down a “don’t know” response. 
They argued that there are two ways in which we may decide that we don’t know the 
answer to a question. One is that we find no relevant information in memory as in their 
example of “Does Margaret Thatcher use an electric tooth-brush?” In this case a rapid 
and definite “don’t know” could be given in 1981. The other way to arrive at a “don’t 
know” is when there is relevant information available, but it is insufficient to lead to a 
confident judgment – as for example in asking whether Kiev is in the Ukraine. This type 
of “don’t know” will be slow and deliberative, as people attempt to use the relevant 
evidence within their existing knowledge base to arrive at an answer, and then decide 
that they cannot decide. 
Glucksberg and McCloskey proposed a two-stage model for verification of a fact. 
First there is a search for relevant information, and then if such information is found, 
there is an evaluative stage. A “don’t know” response can result from either stage. As 
regards the analysis of category vagueness described above, the model would suggest 
that only in the case of a lack of any relevant knowledge of the item in question will an 
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“Unclear” response result from the first quick stage.  
The research described thus far is largely concerned with the relation of 
confidence to accuracy. Apart for some indirectly related studies in opinion survey 
methodology (e.g. Gilljam & Granberg, 1993) there has been little research on the 
general consistency of question answering, regardless of whether the answer is correct 
or not. The issue is of particular importance for the epistemological foundations of our 
knowledge. If we are sure of a fact, then it is tempting to consider that knowledge to be 
permanently represented in long term memory in a way that ensures that a stable 
response is produced whenever the fact is questioned. Intuitively there is a strong 
connection between feeling 100% confident in the truth (or falsity) of a statement and 
being consistent in that belief over time, in the absence of any new information 
(regardless of whether one is correct in one’s belief).  
Overview of the research. The question that we address here concerns the 
consistency with which people answer True/False statements. We consider not just 
categorization statements but also general knowledge and other kinds of statement. The 
procedure adopted for Experiments 1 – 3 is to compare consistency for a group who 
simply answer Yes or No, with that for a group who are allowed 3 responses, Definitely 
True, Uncertain and Definitely False. (Experiment 4 adopted a within-subjects version 
of the procedure).  The question is whether the latter group show increased consistency 
relative to the former. Our research differs in two important respects from previous 
research in this area. First, we do not restrict ourselves to statements for which there is 
an objectively determined truth or falsity. Hence we are not primarily concerned with 
calibration and accuracy. Second, in addition to objective facts we also consider a range 
of other types of knowledge, such as the membership of conceptual categories, personal 
moral beliefs and values, and personal aspirations and preferences, which cannot be 
verified by appeal to an external reality. We are particularly interested, not in whether 
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confidence is well calibrated across the scale, but in whether a sense of being 100% 
certain about a statement is a stable state that perseveres across time, and equivalently 
whether being uncertain about the truth of a statement is also a stable state of belief. 
In setting the scene for the research to be reported, it is important to distinguish two 
questions that the research addresses. Our primary concern, as stated above is to test 
whether being 100% certain of a belief provides additional consistency over time. The 
methodology of comparing consistency between the 2-response and 3-response groups 
addresses this question. A second question is whether this effect differs in a qualitative 
way across different domains of knowledge. As will be seen, there is evidence that the 
consistency advantage shown for the 3-response group is only seen in general 
knowledge domains. Given the difficulty in finding an appropriate and representative 
sampling procedure for selecting statements from different domains, it may be harder to 
prove that this interaction reflects a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference 
among domains. We return to this issue in the final discussion. 
Predictions. On the basis of the foregoing arguments it is possible to predict either 
of two outcomes to the procedure of comparing consistency between a 2-response and a 
3-response group. First, it can be argued that if a person is asked to say True or False of 
a statement only if they are 100% certain of the answer, and otherwise to say “unsure”, 
then this sense of certainty should guarantee that they give the same response on both 
occasions. After all, how could one be definitely sure that something is the case, but 
then be uncertain, or even sure that it is false just two weeks later? (Assuming the facts 
have not changed and nothing has happened to lead a person to change their view in the 
mean time.) If long term memory contains a set of stable known facts, and if people can 
differentiate these from those about which they are not completely certain, then the 3-
response condition should show better consistency. Equivalently, if a person can find no 
relevant information in memory that could be used to evaluate a statement, then that fact 
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alone should lead them to an Unsure response on both occasions, and so improve 
consistency.  
Alternatively an analogy can be drawn with a familiar kind of decision making, 
that of a juror who must decide on a verdict. In a criminal case (in England and Wales), 
the jury is instructed to bring in a guilty verdict only if the evidence proves guilt 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”. In a civil law case, a jury has to decide between the two 
parties on the balance of the argument. The former is akin to our 3-response category 
condition. Jurors could be convinced of guilt, convinced of innocence or in a state of 
doubt, and the law directs them to return “not guilty” in either of the latter two cases. (In 
Scottish law, the middle response of “Unproven” is also allowed). The civil law case is 
like our 2-response condition – either the plaintive has made their case or they have not. 
Experience with jury decision making suggests that the decision is no easier to make in 
the former case than the latter. Juries will find it just as hard to reach consensus on 
whether a case is proven beyond reasonable doubt, as on whether the evidence favors 
one side or the other on balance. In other words, this analogy implies that requiring 
people to only say True when they are definitely sure simply moves the decision 
criterion to a higher level, but does nothing about the problem of evaluating the truth of 
the statement itself, and the degree of instability and uncertainty that may be involved in 
assessing the likelihood of its truth. 
For our initial exploration of this issue we created statements of three types, 
representing three different kinds of knowledge in long term memory. First we took 
statements representing semantic knowledge – membership in different semantic 
categories like Fruit, Sport or Tool. As discussed above, the threshold model (Hampton, 
2007) predicts that the 3-response condition should show no more consistency than the 
2-response condition. Second we took statements representing objective factual 
knowledge. Following Glucksberg and McCloskey (1981) we might expect there to be 
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known unknowns in the case of more abstruse general knowledge statements, thus 
leading to greater consistency in the 3-response group. Finally we generated a set of 
items concerning people’s autobiographical details and memories. Here the prediction 
was harder to make. Although it can be argued that autobiographies correspond to 
objective historical facts, there is nonetheless an important difference from other non-
personal statements. That difference is that if a statement is about one’s self, it is more 
than likely that one will attempt to retrieve relevant information and use that in an 
evaluative decision process. In such a case, then autobiographical statements should 
resemble categorization statements more than they do facts of general knowledge. (Note 
that we should expect much less consensus in the case of personal statements, but the 
issue of consistency is unaffected by the level of consensus). 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students (25 female) at City University London 
participated for course credit. There were 16 in each condition. 
Materials. Booklets were constructed with 150 statements in a random order, 
comprising 50 general knowledge statements, 50 category membership statements and 
50 autobiographical memory statements. The items are listed in Appendix A. We aimed 
broadly for each set of 50 statements to include approximately 15 that were clearly true, 
15 that were clearly false, and 20 that might be uncertain. Items in the Appendix are 
labelled Y for Yes if at least 90% of participants in the 2-response condition said True 
(averaged across the two tests), and N for No if at least the same number said False.  
Design and Procedure. Two versions of the booklets were constructed. One had 
the 2 response options “True” and “False”, and the other had the 3 response options 
“100% sure it’s true”, “Not 100% sure either way”, and “100% sure it’s false”. These 
will be referred to as 100% true, Unsure, and 100% false in the presentation of results. 
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Since it was important that participants would only use the true and false responses 
when they were certain about an answer, the instructions were as follows: “Please only 
choose option 1 if you are 100% sure that the statement is true, and only choose option 3 
if you are 100% sure that the statement is false. In all other cases, please use the middle 
option. Don’t worry about using the middle option too much – we only want you to say 
True or False if you are completely clear in your mind about the statement.” Two 
random orders of statements were used, one for the first test and one for the retest which 
took place one week later. On the final page of the booklet at retest, two additional 
questions were added after the main set of statements: “Did you look up or discuss the 
answers to any of the questions since last week?” and “Did you try to remember your 
answers from last week in order to give the same answer?” These questions were 
included in order to provide a check on how participants had responded to the retest. 
While they had been unaware that the same questions would be asked again, it was 
nevertheless possible that they had made an effort to be consistent by recalling their 
earlier responses.1 
Results 
Consistency. There were just 10 missing responses from 32x150 = 4800 data 
points. Table 1 shows the cross-tabulation of responses given on test and retest for each 
of the types of material and for each condition. Cell frequencies are expressed as 
percentages, such that the sum of all 4, or of all 9, cells is 100%. (N for each table was 
between 797 and 800). Thus for example, 24.3% of responses to General knowledge 
questions were “100% sure it’s TRUE” on the first test, of which 19.3% were given the 
same answer at retest, corresponding to a consistency of 79% (19.3 out of 24.3). 
Measures of consistency for each condition were calculated for the three different 
types of statement separately. For the 2-response condition, consistency was calculated 
as the proportion of True-True and False-False response pairs across test/retest. That is 
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the proportion of all first responses that were unchanged at retest. This value was 82% 
for category statements, 82% for general knowledge statements, and 88% for 
autobiographical statements.  
Compared to the 2-response condition, consistency for the 3-response condition 
was lower if calculated simply as the proportion of first responses that were unchanged. 
However expected levels of consistency should be lower for 3 rather than 2 response 
choices, since of 9 possibilities only 3 are consistent, compared with 2 out of 4 for the 2-
response case. For a fair comparison, separate measures of consistency were calculated 
for the likelihood of a 100% true remaining consistent and for the likelihood of a 100% 
false remaining consistent. For the first, the frequencies of Unsure and 100% false 
responses were collapsed, to yield a 2 x 2 table, from which the consistency of 100% 
true responses was calculated as for the 2-response condition. Similarly, for the second 
measure, 100% true and Unsure were collapsed to yield a 2x2 table for the calculation 
of the consistency of 100% false responses.  Mean consistency calculated in this way is 
shown in Figure 1. 
It can be seen in the Figure that there was no difference in consistency for 2- and 
3-response groups for the category statements (M = .82 and .81 respectively). In 
contrast, general knowledge statements showed an increased level of consistency when 
Unsure responses were allowed (M = .82 for 2 responses and .90 for 3 responses). In the 
case of autobiographical facts, where we had made no strong prediction, there was no 
difference in consistency between 2-response and 3-response conditions (M = .88 and 
.86 respectively). Analysis of variance was run across participants and across items with 
factors of type of statement (3 levels) and response condition (2 vs 3 response options). 
There was a marginally significant main effect of type of statement (Min F’(2, 182) = 
2.86, p = .06) and a significant interaction of type of statement with response condition 
(Min F’(2,142) = 3.83, p = .024). There was no overall effect of response condition 
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(F<1). Break-down analysis of the interaction confirmed that there was a significant 
effect of response condition only in the case of general knowledge (Min F’(1,56) = 3.98, 
p =.05). 
In terms of the two final questions, only 2 participants reported having discussed 
or looked up answers, and their consistency was not notably different from the others in 
their group. In addition 13 participants said that they had tried to recall their earlier 
answers – 6 in the 2-response condition and 7 in the 3-response condition. A post hoc 
analysis was therefore possible, breaking down each group into those who did and those 
who did not try to recall their earlier responses. A 3-way ANOVA was run with the two 
factors of response condition and type of statement as before, plus a third factor of 
whether the participant reported trying to recall or not. Neither the main effect of trying 
to recall, nor any interactions involving recall were significant, whereas the interaction 
of response condition and statement type remained strong (F(2, 56) = 7.08, p = .002). 
Discussion 
Three types of knowledge were tested. For general knowledge statements, as 
predicted, there was a notable increase in consistency – from 82% consistency for the 
“True/False” condition to 90% consistency for the 3-response condition. Examination of 
the frequencies in Table 1 showed that a major reason for this consistency was the much 
greater frequency and consistency of “Not 100% sure either way” responses in this type 
of statement. Whereas for category and autobiographical statements a first response of 
not sure was only about 50% likely to be repeated at retest, for the general knowledge 
statements the figure rose to 80%. In other words being unsure was a common and a 
stable cognitive state for the general knowledge statements we used here. A 
consequence of having a large stable group of “Not sure” responses was that the 
likelihood of the definite yes and no responses was reduced, and hence their stability 
was also increased.2 
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In contrast, there was no evidence that people were more consistent in 
categorization if allowed to differentiate cases about which they were definitely sure 
from others where they were unsure. Power calculations for the category condition 
estimated an 80% chance of detecting a difference between the two conditions of 3% or 
greater.  
The third kind of statement used was autobiographical. Here, interestingly, the 
pattern of results matched those of category statements. The general level of consistency 
was somewhat higher, which probably reflected the arbitrary sampling of statements of 
each type. We aimed to match response frequencies across the three types of material, 
and we did this fairly well for the 2 response condition (see top part of Table 1). 
However when allowed three responses, the autobiographical statements proved to have 
fewer Unsure and more 100% false than the category statements. It is perhaps possible 
that there are fewer statements about one’s own life about whose truth one is not sure, 
but no attempt was made to sample statements in any systematic way. 
The results of Experiment 1 lead us to infer that there may be a qualitative 
difference between the kind of knowledge retrieval involved in judging general facts 
and that involved in category membership or autobiographical memory decisions. This 
conclusion must be qualified with the acknowledgement that although a fairly large 
sample of each type of statement was used, there was no obvious way in which to 
sample them in a representative fashion. It is for this reason that all the statements are 
listed in the Appendix. The alternative to a qualitative difference in domains would be a 
quantitative difference across domains in the types of items and distribution of 
responses. For example, as shown in Appendix A, all three domains had equivalent 
numbers of Definitely True items (between 5 and 7), but General Knowledge had more 
Definitely False items (11) than did Category Knowledge (6 items). On the other hand, 
Autobiographical items also had more Definitely False (12) items but patterned like 
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Category Knowledge. More generally, the opportunity for the 3-response advantage to 
appear depends on there being a good sample of unclear items. In this respect, Category 
Knowledge had a greater opportunity (40 items with no 90% consensus of being true or 
false) than the other two domains, and yet still showed no advantage for the 3-response 
condition. 
In the following experiment, we ran a larger scale replication of the categorization 
condition. Since the dissociation depends quite critically on the absence of an effect in 
categorization, we aimed to use a more powerful design to confirm that there is indeed 
no improvement in consistency with 3 responses when category membership is being 
judged. We returned to the issue of personally related information and sought to 
replicate the effect for General Knowledge in Experiments 3 and 4. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-one students (53 female) at a London college participated 
voluntarily. Sixty-two returned for the second test, and data for the other 9 were not 
used. In the final data there were 32 in the 2-response group and 30 in the 3-response 
group. 
Materials. Six semantic categories were used, with a list of 22 items for each 
category. Items were taken from a set of category materials developed by Hampton, 
Dubois & Yeh (2006), and are listed in Appendix B. Hampton et al. aimed to sample 
from the full range of category membership from clear members to clear non-members. 
Based on earlier data, about half the items were expected to lie in the borderline region 
for categorization (probability of a “yes” response between .25 and .75). As in Appendix 
A, (Y) indicates items with a consensus of >90% for a yes response in the 2-response 
condition, and (N) the equivalent for a no response. Some 18% of items were in the first 
group, and 14% in the second group, leaving 68% with the intermediate category 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  16 
membership required to be sensitive to the manipulation used. 
Design and Procedure. Participants were allocated at random to either the 2- or 
the 3-response group. The 2-response group worked through the booklet choosing either 
“yes” or “no” to each category item. The 3-response group had the same booklet, but 
instead of “yes” or “no” they chose one of three responses: “definitely yes”, “maybe” 
and “definitely no”. Instructions for this group emphasized that a yes or no should only 
be given if the participant was confident that it was definitely the right answer. If a 
participant was unfamiliar with any item they were told to leave it blank. All 
participants were retested after a period of two weeks. The order of items was 
alphabetical within category for one half of the booklets in each condition and reverse 
alphabetical for the other. Order of categories was constant. Order was kept the same for 
each participant at test and retest. Participants wrote their names on coversheets each 
week so that booklets could be matched up. Cover sheets were then detached to preserve 
anonymity. 
Results 
Less than 2% of the data were missing owing to non-response to items. Item and 
subject statistics were calculated based on the valid data only. Table 2 shows 
percentages for the cross-tabulation of the responses given on the first and second 
occasions, rounded to the nearest integer. For example for the 2-response group, 52% of 
all responses at the first test were “yes”, and these broke down into 45% where the 
second response was also “yes” and 7% where the second response was “no”. Thus 86% 
(= 44.7/52.1) of initial yes responses were unchanged. Combining the consistent yes 
(44.7%) and consistent no (38.5%) percentages gave a total consistency of 83.2% for the 
2-response group.  
As in Experiment 1, participants were more likely to change their responses in the 
3-response (74% consistent) than in the 2-response group (83% consistent). However, as 
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explained in Experiment 1, it is harder to be consistent in the allocation of 3 response 
categories than just 2. To compare like with like, the data from the 3-response group 
were analysed as in Experiment 1 to provide two separate estimates of consistency, one 
for Definitely Yes versus other responses, and one for Definitely No versus other 
responses.  The two estimates were averaged together for an overall consistency 
measure for the 3-response group. 
When calculated in this way, the mean consistency for the 3-response group was 
83.6%, compared with 83.2% for the 2-response group. Standard errors for the two 
estimated means based on subject variance were 0.9% and 0.7%, giving 95% confidence 
intervals of ± 2% and ± 1.5% respectively. Estimated power was 95% for detecting a 
difference in the group population means of 2% or more, and 80% for a difference of 
1% or more. 
Consistency and response probability. A further analysis considered whether a 
shift in consistency may have been masked by changes in the distribution of items 
across the membership scale. Clearly if a given item has a 90% chance of a “yes” 
response in the 2-response group then it is more likely to receive the same response at 
retest than if it has a 50% chance of a “definitely yes” response in the 3-response group. 
The closer an item is to the criterion cut-off, the more inconsistent a response can be 
expected to be. In fact, assuming independence of the two responses, the expected 
consistency of a response in a two-choice repeated response task is p2 + q2 where p and 
q are the probabilities of the two responses (p + q = 1). This function reaches a 
minimum of 0.5 when p = q = .5, and rises to a maximum of 1 as p or q approaches 1. 
Adopting a high and low criterion could therefore generate shifts in consistency just by 
changing the number of items in the sample that are close to the criterion. Thus if 
response probability is treated as a covariate, it is possible that a difference in 
consistency could emerge between the two groups. 
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To examine this possibility, a data set was prepared based on the three different 
2x2 tables that were used for the consistency calculations above. For each of the 132 
items response probability and consistency were calculated for:  (1) the 2x2 cross-
tabulation table for the 2-response group, (2) the 2x2 table for the 3-response group, 
collapsing Unsure and Definitely No and (3) the 2x2 table for the 3-response group, 
collapsing Definitely Yes and Unsure. Consistency was entered into the dataset for each 
item, together with the response probability of the modal response (i.e. probability of a 
yes where yes was the more common response, and probability of a no if no were more 
frequently given). To illustrate, the item Chess as a Sport contributed three pairs of 
values to the dataset. In the 2-response group it had a probability of a “No” (the modal 
response) of .58 and a consistency of .83; with the high criterion applied to the 3-
response group data the modal response was [Definitely No or Unsure] which occurred 
with a probability of .77 and had a consistency of .87; and with the low criterion applied 
to the 3-response group data the modal response of [Definitely Yes or Unsure] had a 
probability of .60 and a consistency of .77. 
As expected, modal response probability MRP correlated significantly with 
consistency (r(396) = .773, p < .001). Higher MRP necessarily yields higher 
consistency. The question is then whether this may have been masking a difference in 
consistency between the 2- and 3-response groups. Accordingly an ANCOVAR was run 
on consistency with Response group as between-items factor, and MRP as a covariate. 
The results showed a very significant effect of MRP (F(1,393) = 583.3, p < .001) but 
still no effect at all of Response group (F = 0.1). The lack of any difference between 
groups was not therefore an artefact of shifts in response probability between groups. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 confirmed the results of Experiment 1.  There was no improvement 
in consistency when people were given the opportunity of only categorizing items about 
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which they were sure, and leaving the rest unclassified. With 132 items and 62 
participants, the power of the experiment was sufficient to detect even a small 
improvement in the consistency of judgment in the 3- versus the 2-response condition. 
There was no evidence at all that allowing participants the option of saying “maybe” 
rather than forcing them to choose between “yes” and “no” helped to reduce the 
inconsistency of their categorization responses over time. The power was also sufficient 
to test whether an effect was being masked by a shift in item modal response probability 
between conditions (consistency being constrained as MRP approaches ceiling). There 
was no evidence for this possibility. 
The results supported the proposal (Hampton, 2007) that category membership 
falls on a continuum. Decisions are subject to variation because of a range of factors that 
lead to items being placed higher or lower on the continuum on different occasions. As a 
consequence consistency is no greater if a higher standard of certainty is required than if 
people just give a yes or no answer. They also support the conclusion that by and large 
there are no known unknowns when it comes to categorizing familiar items in their 
superordinate categories. 
The third experiment aimed to extend the study to a further domain. Following the 
results for autobiographical facts in Experiment 1, we adopted the working hypothesis 
that the advantage for consistency of being able to say “unsure” is restricted to matters 
of external objective fact, and that where questions of opinion or internal memory are 
involved there is no stable category of known unknowns. To test this notion, 
Experiment 3 again compared three domains of knowledge: general knowledge, 
personal ethical beliefs and personal aspirations. We expected to replicate the greater 
consistency for the 3-response group with general knowledge statements, and wished to 
test whether the advantage would be found reliably when response probability was 
factored out. On the basis of our working hypothesis we also expected to find that the 
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more personal statements about beliefs and aspirations would show no difference 
between the two groups. Finally, to test the generalizability of the results for General 
Knowledge in Experiment 1, a new set of test statements were sampled. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Forty-four students (35 female) at City University, London 
participated voluntarily. Some received course credits. They were randomly divided 
between the two conditions. 
Materials. The booklets were created with 90 statements, comprising 30 general 
knowledge, 30 beliefs and 30 aspirations. The statements are listed in Appendix C. 
Beliefs and aspirations were devised partly with the help of a focus group of 5 students 
who were asked “what beliefs do you hold?” and “what are your aspirations in life?” 
Others were taken from current affairs news sources. For beliefs the aim was to provide 
a range of beliefs including some that most would hold, some that few would hold and 
some that were controversial issues where different opinions would be found. For 
aspirations there was again a mix of aspirations that most students would hold, 
aspirations that few would hold, and others that some would hold and others not. A new 
set of general knowledge statements were created with the aid of a quiz book. As in the 
previous Experiments, items with strong consensus are labelled Y and N in the 
Appendix. There were 4 such items for General Knowledge, 5 for Beliefs and 11 for 
Aspirations. 
Design and Procedure. The design was the same as in Experiment 1, except that 
the 3 levels of the domain factor were general knowledge, beliefs and aspirations. The 
same instructions and response labels were used, again emphasizing that the “100% sure 
it’s True” and “100% sure it’s False” responses should only be used when the 
respondent was certain about the answer. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  21 
Results 
Consistency of responding was calculated in the same way as in Experiment 1, for 
each of the 3 domains, and for each of the two groups. The data are summarized in 
Table 3 and mean consistency by condition is graphed in Figure 2. ANOVA was run on 
the consistency data, calculated as before, across subjects and items, with Type of 
Statement and Response group as factors. There were no significant main effects, but 
there was a significant interaction of Type of Statement with Response group (Min 
F’(2,166) = 7.98, p < .001). Breakdown analysis confirmed that the 3-response group 
was more stable than the 2-response group, only in the case of General Knowledge (Min 
F’(1, 71) = 9.75, P < .005) and not for the other two types of statement, where the 2-
response group was slightly (although not significantly) more stable. 
As in Experiment 2, an analysis was run to test whether the results were affected 
by a change in the distribution of items across the probability of categorization. As 
before, an ANCOVAR was run with modal response probability MRP as a covariate. 
The interaction of Domain by Response group was still significant (F(2,263) = 4.58, p< 
.05) when MRP was held constant as a covariate. 
Discussion 
Using a new sample of statements, Experiment 3 replicated the pattern of data found for 
general knowledge statements in Experiment 1. Furthermore it was possible to confirm 
that the pattern was not just owing to a redistribution of items in terms of probability of 
a True response in the 3-response group. In contrast, neither personal aspirations nor 
beliefs showed any greater consistency when the third response option was included. In 
keeping with our hypothesis, the personal nature of this type of information was such 
that our participants were unlikely to think “that is a belief or aspiration that I know 
nothing about”. As a consequence, the percentages of “unsure” responses that were 
repeated on the second occasion were just 58% and 77%, compared with 91% for the 
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knowledge questions. 
Experiment 4 
The final experiment to be reported extended the domains of knowledge tested to 
hedonic statements. Likes and dislikes are clearly a paradigm example of subjective 
personal facts. They are also clearly graded in as much as one can like or dislike things 
to different degrees. As such we expected that they would pattern like the other 
subjective statements used in Experiment 3, namely beliefs and aspirations. To test the 
generality of the findings we also introduced a change in the methodology. Rather than 
use two groups of participants, we combined the 2-response and 3-response conditions 
into a single task. Participants were offered four response choices. In this way three 
threshold criteria were incorporated into a single scale running from “100% sure it’s 
true”, and “Probably true but not 100% sure”, through “Probably false, but not 100% 
sure”, to “100% sure it’s false”. In this way the data could be collapsed into two 
response bins to test consistency in three different ways. Using a high threshold 
involved measuring the consistency of a “100% sure it’s true” versus any other 
response. The middle threshold measured the consistency of a true versus a false 
response, regardless of certainty; and the low threshold measured consistency for a 
“100% sure it’s false” as opposed to any other response. In addition to changing the 
design and response scale, a different mode of analysis was also used. The tetrachoric 
correlation coefficient (Drasgow, 1988; Ferguson, 1966) measures the degree of 
association in a 2x2 table. It is specifically suited to the situation in which each binary 
variable is the result of dichotomizing an underlying normally distributed variable. Each 
of these response variables is assumed to be correlated to the same degree with a single 
underlying latent variable, which is the “true” value of the item on the scale. The square 
of this underlying correlation is the tetrachoric correlation. 
The tetrachoric model has three parameters which are estimated from the 3 
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degrees of freedom in the table, namely the dichotomization threshold of each response, 
and the degree of correlation between the two responses. It is the latter that we take as 
our measure of consistency. If there is greater consistency in deciding that something is 
100% certainly true or false, than in deciding that it is simply true or false, then the two 
2x2 matrices corresponding to a high and a low threshold will show higher values of the 
tetrachoric correlation than the 2x2 matrix that corresponds to the middle threshold. 
Method. 
Participants. Participants were 40 students at City University London, the 
majority of whom were female. Some additional participants who did not return for the 
second session were dropped from the study. 
 Materials. Thirty statements were created for each of three domains: 
Categorization, General Knowledge and Hedonic Likes/Dislikes. Three statements had 
to be dropped because of a printing error, so there were respectively 30, 28 and 29 
statements in the three domains for the analysis. Category and Knowledge items were 
randomly sampled from those used in Experiment 1, with the addition of a new category 
“type of music”. The Hedonic statements are listed in Appendix D. They were all 
phrased as “I like ….”, and were generated with the help of a small group of students to 
reflect a range of tastes and aversions. Four of the Hedonic statements reached a 
positive consensus of 90% (students still like cookies and milk-shakes), and none 
reached a negative consensus at this level (see Appendix D). 
Design and Procedure. The same procedure was used as in Experiment 3, with 
participants working through a booklet, and then returning after a period of 
approximately a week to do the task again. The response scale was however changed to 
incorporate four responses as described above. As a result the experiment was a single 
group design, with three domains of knowledge as a within-subjects factor, and the three 
measures of consistency taken at the three criteria (high, middle and low) as a second 
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within-subjects factor. 
Results. 
Response frequencies are summarized in a 4x4 cross-tabulation for each domain 
in Table 4. The data for each domain for each participant were collapsed into three 2x2 
tables by setting a cut-off criterion at three different points on the response scale and 
collapsing all responses either side of the criterion. This procedure is illustrated in 
Figure 3. The resulting 9 data matrices (one for each threshold applied to each domain) 
were used to calculate 9 tetrachoric correlations for each participant. To avoid zero cell 
frequencies, 1 response was added to each of the four cells before the analysis. The 
analysis was performed on a Dell PC using TETCORR (Fleming, 2005) under Windows 
XP. Results are shown in Figure 4. The mean correlation reflects the degree of 
consistency in maintaining responses either side of each threshold criterion. It is clear 
that in the case of General Knowledge, but not in the other two domains, there was a 
lower consistency for the middle threshold (the simple True/False judgment) than for 
either of the other two. This conclusion was confirmed with an ANOVA with two 
repeated measures factors of Domain (Categories, Knowledge and Likes), and 
Threshold (High, Middle and Low). There was a significant main effect of Domain 
(F(2,78) = 17.3, p < .001, MSe = .08) and no effect of Threshold. However the 
interaction was significant (F(2,78) = 5.6, p < .001, MSe = .016). Breakdown analysis 
showed that there was an effect of Threshold for the General Knowledge statements 
(F(2,78) = 15.206, p < .001), but not for either of the other domains (F(2,78) = 2.0 for 
Categories and 0.6 for Likes). A further breakdown of the main effect of Threshold for 
the Knowledge statements showed that the consistency measure for the Middle 
threshold (M = .77) was significantly below both the High threshold (M=.83, p < .05) 
and the Low threshold (M = .88, p < .001). 
Discussion. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  25 
 Experiment 4 confirmed the pattern of results in earlier Experiments, that 
Categorization shows no difference in consistency between a True/False judgment and a 
Definitely True/ Not Definitely True or a Definitely False/ Not Definitely False 
judgment, whereas for General Knowledge statements there is such a difference. Our 
hypothesis that the lack of difference is primarily to be found in subjective domains was 
supported by the significant interaction showing that Hedonic likes and dislikes showed 
the same pattern as categorization, in contrast to the General Knowledge statements. A 
particular advance in Experiment 4 was the introduction of two innovations. First we 
used a single group of participants and combined the previous 3-response versus 2-
response contrast into a single 4-response scale. Second we adopted a new method of 
statistical analysis using the tetrachoric correlation which is particularly suited to the 
analysis of this type of data. The confirmation of the earlier results with this different 
methodology confirmed the robustness of the results. 
General Discussion 
The central question of concern in this paper is the degree to which people are 
aware of the unreliability of their judgments. Are we sufficiently aware of the 
uncertainty in particular answers to the extent that we can reliably differentiate unclear 
cases from clear cases? The results of our experiments suggest that for many domains 
the answer is no. For categorization, autobiographical memories, beliefs, aspirations, 
and likes or dislikes, when participants differentiated the cases about which they were 
100% sure from the rest, they were no more likely to give a consistent response at retest 
than if they were just forced to say “true” or “false” to each item regardless. Prima facie 
this result is counter-intuitive. It implies that when a person declares that they are 
“definitely 100% sure” that something is true, it is just as possible that they will change 
their mind in a week’s time as if they had simply said that on balance it was more likely 
to be true than false. In the following section we discuss each of the domains of 
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knowledge in turn. 
For categorization decisions, the results across experiments provide clear support 
for the threshold model of category decisions (Hampton, 2007; Verheyen et al, 2010). In 
none of the experiments was there any indication that, as measured by consistency, 
second order vagueness (the point at which a statement ceases to be vague) is any less 
vague than first order vagueness (the point at which a statement ceases to be false). This 
result has important implications for the philosophical debate concerning the best way to 
treat vague statements. For example Kamp and Partee’s (1995) treatment of vagueness 
using Fine’s Supervaluations (Fine, 1975) requires that the borders of the region of 
vagueness are themselves less vague. (There is a risk of an infinite regress in which 
there is a region where the truth of a statement is vague, then there is vagueness about 
where that region itself begins, then vagueness about where the vagueness of the region 
begins, and so forth.) The result also suggests that explanations of fuzziness in 
categorization that rely on epistemological uncertainty (Bonini et al., 1999), or on 
contextual ambiguity (Braisby, 1993) would additional have to explain why people 
apparently show no awareness of their lack of knowledge or of the ambiguity of the 
task. 
Of more direct psychological import, the results for categorization were 
contrasted with the way in which people responded to general knowledge statements. 
The intuition that there may be questions to which one confidently does not know the 
answer, and that this state of ignorance will remain stable across time was borne out by 
the results of Experiments 1, 3 and 4. For general knowledge statements there were 
clearly a number of items that were known unknowns, and hence a stable “unsure” 
response was given. The contrast between the two domains was also seen in the 
likelihood of the most extreme form of inconsistency, where a 100% Definitely True 
turned into a 100% Definitely False a week later (or vice versa). Looking at Tables 1 – 
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4, this pattern was seen in 7%, 6% and 4% of cases for the categorization domain across 
experiments, but in only 3%, 1% and 2% of cases in the general knowledge domain. 
Barsalou (1987) reported similar levels of shift in judgments of typicality within 
categories, with items that were most typical in week 1 sometimes being judged least 
typical a week or two later. It is probable that these two phenomena reflect the same 
cognitive process. 
Could the observed difference between categorization and general knowledge in 
some way reflect a quantitative difference in the selection of items for testing, rather 
than some qualitative difference in the nature of the information and its processing? 
While impossible to rule such a difference out, we would argue strongly for a qualitative 
difference. First, a wide range of categories and items were sampled from the usual 
range of category norms, so the items were representative of conceptual categories 
(albeit with a preponderance of borderline cases). Second we tested two different sets of 
general knowledge statements, and the reader can confirm that there was nothing 
unusual in these items, some of which were easy and some hard (just as for 
categorization). Third, the use of different statistical measures, including an analysis of 
covariance in Experiments 2 and 3, ruled out the possibility of the observed interaction 
being owing to differences in the distribution of probability of “yes” or “definitely yes” 
responses across the item lists. 
Having made this strong claim for categorization, we can be less confident as 
concerns the other “personal” information used in Experiments 1, 3 and 4. For these 
domains the sampling was less easy to control, and each domain was tested only once. 
Each domain (e.g. beliefs, aspirations etc.) was sampled in a relatively informal way, 
with the help of some pilot work. Failure to find a consistency advantage in the 3-
response condition is therefore less secure as evidence about a fundamental difference in 
how the domain knowledge is processed. It was nonetheless striking that in each case 
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the group difference was significantly less than that for general knowledge, particularly 
bearing in mind that the significant Min F’ statistic suggests that the effect is 
generalizable both to new participants and to new items. 
Thus autobiographical statements of the kind used in Experiment 1 also showed 
very few known unknowns. This failure to find stable unknown items may relate to a 
phenomenon noted by Gentner and Collins (1981). They showed that we can reliably 
use the fact that we have no memory of an event to infer that the event did not occur. If 
asked “Did you ever shake hands with Richard Nixon”, people can confidently know 
that they did not, simply because they have no recollection of the event, and if it had 
occurred then it is highly probable that they would remember it. Failure to find traces in 
autobiographical memory will be taken as evidence that a statement is false, whereas 
failure to find information about a general knowledge statement does not give any 
reason to believe that it is false. The implication is that for general knowledge as the 
level of retrieved relevant information decreases, responses tend to a stable “not sure” 
response, whereas for autobiographical memories, as the level of relevant information 
decreases, responses tend to a stable “false” response. The less a person can recall about 
ever being on a bus when it broke down, the more they will tend to believe that it 
definitely did not happen. Unlike general knowledge, lack of information about personal 
experiences will not lead to a known unknown.  
As a consequence of the result with autobiographical statements, the hypothesis 
was formed that maybe the Rumsfeld Effect (the absence of known unknowns) occurs 
primarily in domains that involve personal information – a person’s individual 
memories, beliefs, aspirations and likes or dislikes. Experiments 3 and 4 confirmed this 
hypothesis (subject to the caveats already mentioned). Once again, knowledge 
statements showed improved consistency when an “unsure” response was allowed, but 
statements involving personal beliefs and aspirations (Experiment 3) or hedonic likes 
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and dislikes (Experiment 4) did not.  
Are there other domains than General Knowledge where known unknowns can be 
demonstrated? Other unpublished studies by the first author with Elizabeth Thwaites 
and with Priya Gorasia have found domains where consistency does improve with 
provision of an Unsure option. In the first study with Thwaites, participants judged 
whether unfamiliar words had particular meanings or not. Consistency across occasions 
was greater for the group who were allowed to say “Unsure”, even for words that they 
claimed to have seen before, but of whose meanings they were unsure. In the second 
study with Gorasia, memory for a short video was tested on two occasions with a 
True/False recognition test. Again, the 3-response group showed better consistency than 
the 2-response group when it came to judging the truth or falsity of statements about the 
witnessed event. Both of these domains involve externally verifiable facts (word 
meanings and actual events), and so provide further confirmation of our hypothesis that 
the Rumsfeld Effect reflects a crucial distinction between more subjective and more 
objective domains of knowledge. 
A model of fact verification 
Our explanation of our results owes a debt to Glucksberg and McCloskey’s 
(1981) analysis of the stages involved in verifying a fact. They proposed that first there 
is a search of memory for relevant information. If this search fails to find anything, then 
a quick “don’t know” or “uncertain” response can be made. Alternatively if relevant 
information is retrieved, a slower “don’t know” may still result, if the information 
proves insufficient to answer the question. The present results for knowledge statements 
are consistent with this general model, and additionally suggest that a “don’t know” 
arising in the first stage from the lack of relevant information is a more stable response 
than one arising from the second stage. When memory contains no relevant information, 
then participants in the 3-response condition can reliably state that they are unsure. The 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  30 
following week there is still no information in memory, and so they come up with the 
same answer. Those unfortunate enough to be in the 2-response group have to use some 
other means of guessing the answer, and so risk changing their mind the following 
week.  
To explain the results for categorization and for personal information, it is 
suggested that in these domains memory will almost always contain relevant 
information. A statement about your past experiences or future ambitions may be more 
or less meaningful to you, but you will always have some relevant basis in memory on 
which to base your answer. In this case it is a question of trying to retrieve evidence and 
argument in favour of the statement being true or not. Would you like to meet the Queen 
(of England)? You think of the pros and cons and weigh them up in your mind. The 
consequence of this slower process is that you accumulate a degree of confidence in the 
answer being true, and then compare this to some threshold criterion. In the case of a 
“definitely true” answer, the criterion is higher than just for a “true” answer. But in both 
groups, the participant is doing the same thing – accumulating reasons for the statement 
being true or false, and then deciding if the threshold is passed. They do not decide that 
there are no reasons either way, so that no decision can sensibly be made.  
If this account is correct, then we would predict that there may be some cases of 
category membership and some autobiographical memories and other personal 
information that would show greater consistency in the 3-response condition. If a 
category item was so unfamiliar as to be unknown to the participant – for example it 
might be whether euglena is an animal (Hampton, 1998) – then it could end up being 
given a stable “unsure” response. Similarly if asked to evaluate a memory such as “On 
11 November 2004 I wore a blue shirt”, (and assuming that the person did regularly 
wear blue shirts at the time) then again a consistent “unsure” response could be 
generated. For other personal domains, a statement of belief about some unknown 
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practice (e.g. the ethics of Finland’s whaling policy) would likely also engender stable 
unsure responses, as would aspirations for unknown goals (I would like to take a 
vacation in Carvoeiro). In such cases, the initial attempt to retrieve relevant information 
would fail to find any reason for giving either a True or a False response. The pros and 
cons would never be evaluated against a criterion, and so the response of “unsure” 
would be more stable.  
The Rumsfeld Effect is the finding that there are “unknown unknowns – the ones 
we don't know we don't know”. We claim that when a decision is made by accumulating 
evidence and comparing it to a criterion then responses of “sure” and “unsure” are like 
unknown unknowns. We cannot access a stable state of uncertainty in a reliable fashion.  
It is known that people are overconfident, judging that they are 100% certain about 
things, 10% of which they have got wrong (Fischhoff et al., 1977). The contribution of 
the present research is to show that for personal domains of knowledge the belief that 
one is 100% confident that something is definitely true is a surprisingly unstable mental 
state. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  32 
References 
Barsalou, L. W. (1987). The instability of graded structure: implications for the nature 
of concepts. In U.Neisser (Ed.), Concepts and conceptual development: 
Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization (pp. 101-140). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bonini, N., Osherson, D. N., Viale, R., & Williamson, T. (1999). On the psychology of 
vague predicates. Mind and Language, 14, 377-393. 
Braisby, N. R. (1993). Stable concepts and context-sensitive classification. Irish Journal 
of Psychology, 14, 426-441. 
Drasgow F. (1988) Polychoric and polyserial correlations. In Kotz L, Johnson NL 
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of statistical sciences. Vol. 7, pp. 69-74. New York: Wiley. 
Ferguson, G. A. (1966). Statistical analysis in psychology and education. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese, 30, 265-300. 
Fisher, P., Wood, J., & Cheng, T. (2004). Where is Helvellyan? Fuzziness of multiscale 
landscape morphometry. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29, 
106-128. 
Fischoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). Knowing with certainty: The 
appropriateness of extreme confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 3, 552-564. 
Fleming, J. S. (2005). TETCORR: A program to compute smoothed tetrachoric 
correlation matrices. Behavior Research Methods, 37, 59-64. 
Gentner, D. & Collins, A. C. (1981). Studies of inference from lack of knowledge. 
Memory & Cognition, 9, 434-443. 
Gilljam, M. & Granberg, D. (1993). Should we take don't know for an answer? The 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 57, 348-357. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  33 
Glucksberg, S. & McCloskey, M. (1981). Decisions about ignorance: Knowing that you 
don't know. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 
7, 311-325. 
Hampton, J. A. (1979). Polymorphous Concepts in Semantic Memory. Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 441-461. 
Hampton, J. A. (1995). Testing Prototype Theory of Concepts. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 34, 686-708. 
Hampton, J. A. (1998). Similarity-based categorization and fuzziness of natural 
categories. Cognition, 65, 137-165. 
Hampton, J. A. (2007). Typicality, Graded Membership and Vagueness. Cognitive 
Science, 31, 355-383. 
Hampton, J. A., Dubois, D., & Yeh, W. (2006). The effects of pragmatic context on 
classification in natural categories. Memory & Cognition, 34, 1431-1443. 
Kamp, H. & Partee, B. (1995). Prototype theory and compositionality. Cognition, 57, 
129-191. 
Keefe, R. & Smith, P. (1997). Theories of vagueness. In R.Keefe & P. Smith (Eds.), 
Vagueness: a reader (pp. 1-57). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Klin, C. M., Guzman, A. E., & Levine, W. H. (1997). Knowing that you don't know: 
Metamemory and discourse processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23, 1378-1393. 
Koehler, D. J., Brenner, L. A., & Griffin, D. (2002). The calibration of expert judgment: 
Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. 
Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that we know? The accessibility model of the 
feeling of knowing. Psychological Review, 100, 609-639. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  34 
Lichtenstein, S., Fischoff, B., & Phillips, L. D. (1982). Calibration of probabilities: The 
state of the art to 1980. In D.Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), 
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. (pp. 306-334). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Liu, Y., Su, Y., Xu, G., & Chan, R. C. K. (2007). Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-
knowing: Knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60, 672-680. 
McCloskey, M. & Glucksberg, S. (1978). Natural categories: Well-defined or fuzzy 
sets? Memory & Cognition, 6, 462-472. 
McCloskey, M. & Glucksberg, S. (1979). Decision processes in verifying category 
membership statements: Implications for models of semantic memory. Cognitive 
Psychology, 11, 1-37. 
Seely, H. (2003) (Ed.). Pieces of Intelligence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H. 
Rumsfeld. New York: Free Press. 
Verheyen, S., Hampton, J.A., & Storms, G. (2010). A probabilistic threshold model: 
Analyzing semantic categorization data with the Rasch model. Acta Psychologica, 
135, 216-225. 
Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. London: Routledge. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  35 
Author Notes 
Address all correspondence concerning this article to James A. Hampton, Department of 
Psychology, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V OHB, UK. Email: 
hampton@city.ac.uk. We thank Priya Gorasia, Gurinder Jai and Elizabeth Thwaites for 
their help in developing this research.  
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  36 
Footnote 
1. It is of course possible that one or more of the autobiographical events may have 
occurred to participants in the intervening week. The likelihood of this was considered 
very low, and would in any case affect consistency in both conditions. 
2. Low response probability leads to greater predicted consistency because of the way 
consistency was calculated. The repetition of any response other than the designated 
response was counted as consistent. Thus if Definitely True had a low probability, 
{Either Not sure Or Definitely False} had a high probability and so was likely to be 
repeated. Hence the predicted consistency of a Definitely True response would 
paradoxically increase as the probability of that response decreased. This issue is 
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APPENDIX A. Statements used in Experiment 1 
Note: (Y) and (N) indicate items receiving >90% True, or >90% False responses respectively in the 2-response condition.
CATEGORY STATEMENTS 
An apple is a fruit (Y) 
An avocado is a fruit 
A carrot is a fruit  
A coconut is a fruit 
A grape is a fruit (Y) 
A mushroom is a fruit (N) 
An olive is a fruit 
Rhubarb is a fruit 
A tomato is a fruit 
A walnut is a fruit 
An artichoke is a vegetable 
Bamboo shoots are a vegetable 
A cereal is a vegetable  
Garlic is a vegetable 
Lettuce is a vegetable (Y) 
A peanut is a vegetable (N) 
Sage is a vegetable 
Seaweed is a vegetable 
A turnip is a vegetable  
Billiards is a sport  
Bullfighting is a sport 
Chess is a sport 
Darts is a sport  
Hunting is a sport 
Kite flying is a sport 
Mountaineering is a sport 
Playing cards is a sport 
Teaching is a sport  (N) 
Washing dishes is a sport (N) 
An axe is a tool  
A bottle is a tool  
A bucket is a tool 
A pen is a tool 
A rake is a tool  
A sewing needle is a tool 
A tire is a tool  
A toothbrush is a tool 
An umbrella is a tool 
Varnish is a tool 
A chair is furniture (Y) 
A cushion is furniture 
A desk is furniture (Y) 
A door mat is furniture 
A lamp is furniture 
A piano is furniture 
A remote control is furniture (N) 
A rug is furniture 
A saucepan is furniture  
A wastebasket is furniture 
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GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 
A common side effect of antidepressants is itching skin rashes 
Adidas produces more shoes than Reebok 
Aikido is a Japanese martial art where one often practices with wooden sticks 
Aliens control people’s minds (N) 
Astronauts wear spacesuits when taking a walk outside spaceships  
Bicycles do not have wheels (N) 
Black and Green tea have generally equally amounts of caffeine in them 
Britain produces more meat than grain 
Certain sounds can be very loud (Y) 
Everything shown on the TV is true (N) 
Green tea can enhance reaction time 
Humans are 60-65% water 
If climate change accelerates the Mediterranean will dry out within 85 years 
If you faint standing up you are more likely to land on your back than on your front 
In England cars drive on the left (Y) 
In humans the spleen is larger than the liver 
In parts of Africa there are still dinosaurs (N) 
In the winter Canada is colder than Finland 
John is the most common name in Britain 
 
Lizard tastes like chicken (N) 
London has more than 11 airports 
Mongolia is a country (Y) 
Music is something edible delivered in boxes (N) 
No vehicle can go faster than the speed of light 
North Korea is larger than South Korea 
Olives are more popular in Greece than in Italy 
People living in arctic conditions can breathe under water (N) 
Platinum is more expensive than diamond 
Sausages from Germany and sausages from Austria taste about the same 
Scandinavia is formed by five countries 
Sharks have been developing for millions of years 
Snow falls from the sky  
Some boats have motors others have sails (Y) 
Some poisonous plants can induce prolonged coma in humans 
Texas is the size of Oklahoma 
The earth is flat (N) 
The Internet was originally developed for military reasons 
The official language of Sweden in Swedish  
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The pope’s name is George W. Bush (N) 
The price of a cup of coffee at Starbucks is more than 100 pounds (N) 
The Rosetta stone contains Egyptian, Greek and Persian writing 
The Saxons used lengths of copper thread as a method of payment 
The sea is deep in some places (Y) 
The Uruguayan flag has red in it 
The world ended on the millennium (N) 
The world’s largest garage is in Los Angeles 
There are countries bigger than the UK (Y) 
There are more than 15,000 habitants in London  
Vikings used to live in Scotland 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
During the last two years I have been to at least one fancy dress party 
Growing up I was often ill 
I am a certified pilot (N) 
I eat more sweets during the weekend 
I have a brother  
I have been downhill skiing in the Alps (N) 
I have been on the Jerry Springer show (N) 
I have been to a Robbie Williams concert (N) 
I have been to the Niagara Falls  
I have bought a lottery ticket at least once  
I have broken a leg (N) 
I have called a close family member by the wrong name (Y) 
I have eaten four bowls of cereal in one day 
I have experienced heavy rain and bright sunshine at the same time 
I have had bad luck on a Friday the 13th 
I have met a celebrity 
I have never participated in a world cup  
I have prepared a dish with spring onions 
I have prepared and served shark soup (N) 
I have read a book with more than 450 pages (Y) 
I have read parts of Homer’s Iliad 
I have seen a living raven up close  
I have seen a meteor hit the ground (N) 
I have seen a very skilful magician. 
I have seen two traffic accidents in one day 
I have stayed in a hotel (Y) 
I have swum with dolphins (N) 
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I have used a blue notebook 
I have visited two museums in one day 
I have witnessed a purple sunset 
I have worn a grey hat 
I know someone who has been to Australia (Y) 
I once burned a shepherd’s pie in the oven 
I once had the flu for more than two weeks 
I once owned a pair of yellow sneakers (N) 
I once owned a teddy bear (Y) 
I studied a second language in school (Y) 
Last year there was more sun than this year 
My birthday is in July (N) 
My blood group is AB 
My mother is named Anne-Marie (N) 
Once I bought fruit that was out of date 
Once I forgot to lock my front door 
Once I got oil stains on my new jeans 
Once I made a huge bargain at a second hand shop 
Once I received a parcel in the post  
Once I was rescued by a fireman from a burning house (N) 
Once I woke up in the middle of the night startled by loud birds 
Once I wrote a short story (Y)
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Appendix B: Categories and Category Items used in Experiment 2 
  Note: (Y) indicates >90% yes responses, (N) indicates >90% no responses in the 2-response condition 
FRUIT VEGETABLE SPORT SCIENCE TOOL FURNITURE 
almond (N) artichoke aerobics advertising (N) axe (Y) ashtray 
apple (Y) asparagus (Y) dancing agriculture book (N) book 
aubergine (N) bamboo shoot billiards archaeology bucket bookends 
avocado celery (Y) bridge architecture calculator bucket (N) 
banana (Y) cereal (N) bullfighting astrology dictionary curtains 
carrot (N) chili pepper chess criminology funnel cushion 
coconut cloves croquet dentistry hammer (Y) desk (Y) 
cucumber dandelion crosswords (N) economics key dishwasher 
ginger (N) garlic darts geography pen door mat 
mushroom (N) lettuce (Y) fishing geometry pitchfork lamp 
olive mint footballing (Y) literature rake painting 
onion (N) mushroom frisbee mathematics scalpel (Y) piano 
orange  (Y) parsley hiking medicine (Y) scissors (Y) pillow 
pine cone peanut (N) hunting meteorology screw plate (N) 
pomegranate (Y) potato (Y) jogging mineralogy sewing needle refrigerator 
pumpkin rice kite flying nutrition stone rug 
rhubarb sage mountaineering palm reading (N) string shelf (Y) 
strawberry (Y) seaweed playing cards (N) pharmacy (Y) toothbrush suitcase (N) 
sugar beet soybean skiing (Y) philosophy tractor table (Y) 
tomato spinach (Y) surfing (Y) psychology trunk telephone 
walnut (N) turnip tennis (Y) religious studies (N) umbrella television 
watermelon (Y) watercress weightlifting sociology varnish waste basket 
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Appendix C: Statements used in Experiment 3 
Note: Items marked (Y) and (N) received respectively >90% Yes, and >90% No answers in the 2-response condition.
ASPIRATIONS 
I aspire to be on TV. (N) 
I aspire to have a successful and secure career.  
I aspire to meet the Queen. (N) 
I hope to fight for my country.  
I hope to pursue an acting career in the future. (N) 
I hope to pursue my passion for singing in the future. (N) 
I hope to start my own business. 
I want to do a parachute jump. 
I want to have children one day. (Y) 
I want to swim with dolphins. 
I would like shake hands with the Prime Minister. (N) 
I would like to be retired by the age of 60.  
I would like to climb Mount Everest.  
I would like to do a bungee jump. 
I would like to get married one day.  
I would like to have a wax model of myself in Madame Tussauds. (N) 
I would like to have the opportunity to work abroad. 
I would like to help people who are less fortunate than me. (Y) 
I would like to meet my favourite celebrity.  
I would like to migrate to another country in the future. 
I would like to win the lottery. 
It is my ambition to become the Prime Minister. (N) 
It is my ambition to have political power. 
It is my ambition to learn to play a particular instrument one day. 
It is my ambition to own a house one day. (Y) 
It is my ambition to play for my favourite football team. (N) 
It is my ambition to run the marathon. 
It is my ambition to study further than degree level. 
It is my ambition to travel into space. 
It is my ambition to travel the world. 
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BELIEFS 
A father figure is important in a child’s life. (Y) 
Abortion is acceptable.   
Animal testing is wrong. 
Children aged between 10-16 years should be allowed to testify in court.  
Children should always grow up in contact with both of their biological 
parents.  
Couples who live together before marriage are committing a sin.  
Divorce is unacceptable.  
Freedom of speech is vital to have in society. (Y) 
Heaven and Hell exist. 
Honorary killings are sinful. (Y) 
I believe in a particular religion.  
I believe in God.  
It is acceptable to have breast implantation if it will boost self confidence. 
It is acceptable to use contraception. (Y) 
It is justifiable to lie under certain circumstances.  
It is possible to contact the dead. 
It is safe to travel on the London Underground after the 7/7 attack.  
Life sentences should be given to all offenders who have committed a 
murder. 
Madeleine McCann’s parents are at fault for her disappearance.  
Muslims are fairly portrayed in the media. 
Religion is important.  
Same-sex couples in a stable relationship should be allowed to marry. 
Same-sex partners should be allowed to raise children. 
Sex before marriage is acceptable.  
Sex changes are a sin.  
Smacking children is unacceptable. 
The death penalty is wrong.  
The man should always be the primary bread winner. 
There is reincarnation after death. 
Women often still face gender discrimination in the work place. (Y) 
 
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 
14 men have walked on the moon.  
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4 teaspoons make up 1 tablespoon. 
An emerald wedding anniversary is celebrated after 55 years.  
Chromophobia is the fear of colours.  
GI normally stands for Government Issue. 
If Prince William became King, he would be William the 5th.  
In Roman numerals 555 is displayed DLV.  
India is the country with the most number of Universities. (N) 
India’s national symbol is a lotus flower.  
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population.  
Jim Davis created the cartoon cat Garfield.  
Margaret Thatcher was the last Prime Minister not to have a wife. 
Prior to 1664, New York was called New Amsterdam.  
Richard Nixon made the first phone call to the moon.  
Starbucks is named after a character in Moby Dick.  
The ‘e’ in ‘e-mail` stands for electronic.  (Y) 
The ‘mp’ in mp3 players stands for moving picture.  
The American flag has 50 stars.  
The clothes logo DKNY is short for Donna Karan New York.  
The first e-mail was sent in 1962.  
The First Lord of the Treasury is the Prime Minister. (Y) 
The first tea bags were made by Tetley.  
The French flag has blue in it. (Y) 
The leader of the Orchestra plays the cello.  
The title of the person who gives the results of elections is the Returning 
Officer.  
The translation of Volkswagen is ‘People’s car’.  
The Union Jack is an alternative name for the Union Flag.  
The V in DVD stands for versatile.  
The word ‘safari’ originates from the language of Swahili.   
There are 30 individual pieces in a set of dominoes. 
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Appendix D: Likes and Dislikes Statements used in Experiment 4 
Note: Items marked (Y) received >90% Definite or Probably Yes responses. No items had >90% No responses. 
I like listening to classical music 
I like watching cricket 
I like pizza (Y) 
I like Kate Moss 
I like Robert Mugabe  
I like Tom Cruise 
I like George Clooney 
I like watching golf 
I like Prince William 
I like listening to opera music 
I like Will Smith 
I like Beyonce 
I like watching tennis 
I like spinach 
I like Nelson Mandela 
I like Brad Pitt 
I like pasta (Y) 
I like George W Bush  
I like Naomi Campbell 
I like Nicole Kidman 
I like milkshake (Y) 
I like listening to rock & Roll music 
I like listening to jazz music 
I like chocolate cookies (Y) 
I like watching basketball 
I like Tony Blair 
I like listening to R’n’B music 
I like Angelina Jolie 
I like Sarah Palin 
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Table 1: Percentage of response combinations for each type of statement in Experiment 1. 
TWO-RESPONSE CONDITION Second response   
Type of statement First response TRUE FALSE Total % Consistent 
Category  TRUE 47 9 56 84% 
  FALSE 9 35 44 80% 
Knowledge  TRUE 38 7 45 85% 
  FALSE 11 44 55 80% 
Autobiographical  TRUE 39 5 44 88% 
  FALSE 7 49 56 88% 
 
THREE-RESPONSE CONDITION Second response   








Category 100% TRUE 36 6 5 47 77% 
 Not 100% sure 7 16 7 30 54% 
 100% FALSE 2 4 17 23 73% 
Knowledge 100% TRUE 19 3 2 24 79% 
 Not 100% sure 4 44 6 54 81% 
 100% FALSE 1 2 19 22 88% 
Autobiographical 100% TRUE 34 3 3 40 86% 
 Not 100% sure 3 9 4 16 53% 
 100% FALSE 4 4 36 44 81% 
 
Note: the actual response options were “100% sure it’s true”, “Not 100% sure either way”, 
and “100% sure it’s false”.   
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Second response   
First response YES NO Total % Consistent 
 YES 45 7 52 86% 




Second response   
First response Definite YES MAYBE Definite NO Total % Consistent 
 Definite YES 37 6 3 46 80% 
 MAYBE 4 10 5 19 54% 
 Definite NO 3 6 26 35 73% 
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Table 3: Percentage of response combinations for each type of statement in Experiment 3. 
TWO-RESPONSE CONDITION Second response   
Type of 
statement 
First response TRUE FALSE Total % Consistency 
Aspirations  TRUE 38 6 44 87% 
  FALSE 3 53 56 94% 
Beliefs  TRUE 60 5 65 93% 
  FALSE 4 31 35 89% 
Knowledge  TRUE 40 8 48 84% 
  FALSE 11 41 52 79% 
 
THREE-RESPONSE CONDITION Second response   
Type of 
statement 






Total % Consistency  
Aspirations 100% TRUE 37 4 1 42 88% 
 Not 100% sure 5 16 6 27 58% 
 100% FALSE 1 4 26 31 85% 
Beliefs 100% TRUE 41 3 2 46 88% 
 Not 100% sure 5 24 2 31 77% 
 100% FALSE 3 4 16 23 71% 
Knowledge 100% TRUE 16 2 0 18 90% 
 Not 100% sure 3 59 3 65 91% 
 100% FALSE 1 6 10 17 85% 
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Table 4: Response frequencies for the four responses in Experiment 4, rounded to nearest integer. (See text for wording of responses.) 
 Second response   
Type of statement First response 100% TRUE Probably false Probably true 100% FALSE Total % Consistency  
Categories 100% TRUE 38 10 4 2 54 71% 
 Probably true 6 9 4 2 21 41% 
 Probably false 1 5 4 4 14 30% 
 100% FALSE 2 1 4 6 12 46% 
Knowledge 100% TRUE 26 4 2 1 32 80% 
 Probably true 5 15 6 1 27 56% 
 Probably false 1 5 7 2 14 46% 
 100% FALSE 1 1 2 23 26 87% 
Likes 100% TRUE 31 6 3 3 43 72% 
 Probably true 4 7 2 1 14 48% 
 Probably false 1 3 7 2 13 52% 
 100% FALSE 3 2 5 20 30 68% 
.
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: Mean Consistency by Condition for the Three Types of Statement in 
Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% CI. 
Figure 2: Mean Consistency by Condition for the Three Types of Statement in 
Experiment 3. Error bars show 95% CI. 
Figure 3: Illustrating the creation of three 2x2 matrices from the 4x4 response matrix 
in Experiment 4.  A to D are the four possible responses, 1 to 16 the cell frequencies. 
Shaded squares are summed to yield consistent responses for each 2x2 matrix. 
Figure 4: Mean tetrachoric correlation across participants in Experiment 4 for three 
levels of threshold in three domains. Error bars show 95% CI. 
Hampton et al: Rumsfeld Effect  51 
Figure 1:  
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
  Second Occasion  
  A B C D 
 
First Occasion 
A 1 2 3 4 
B 5 6 7 8 
C 9 10 11 12 
D 13 14 15 16 
 
High threshold matrix      Middle threshold matrix            Low threshold 
matrix 
1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 9 10 11 12 9 10 11 12 
13 14 15 16 13 14 15 16 13 14 15 16 
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